Introduction to Corroborative evidence in audit.
To establish a case in court, whether criminal or civil, the court can rely on the evidence of a single witness so long as the evidence is relevant, admissible and credible.
This is because, as a general rule, no particular number of witnesses is required for the proof of a fact – section 200. Indeed, it has been stated that a “case may be proved by one credible witness; it does not require a sea of heads”. In the words of Oputa J.S.C. in Ademola V. The State (1988)1 NSCC 465 at 472, the truth is not discovered by majority votes, nor by counting of heads…”
Rather, as stated by Muhammed J.S.C, “it is the quality of evidence rather than the number of witnesses… that counts.” It is the qualitative and not the quantitative character of the evidence which the law stresses.
List of content
- Introduction
- what is corroboration in law of evidence
- corroborative audit evidence
- Cases in Which Corroboration is Required
- Cases Where Corroboration is Required as a Matter of Law
- Cases Where Corroboration is required As A Matter Of Practice
- Effect Of Absence Of Corroboration
However, to the general rule that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a case, there are a number of exceptions. In such exceptional cases, corroboration is required; and the corroborative evidence may be provided by any of the means of proof; that is oral testimony, documentary, real, or circumstantial evidence.
The question then is: what is corroboration?
what is corroboration in law of evidence
Corroboration has been defined by the Supreme Court in Nwambe V. The State (1995)3 SCNJ 77 at 94 as:
“A confirmation of a witness’s evidence by an independent testimony. It is evidence which shows or tends to show not merely that the crime has been committed but that it was committed by the accused”
In Haruna Isah V. The State, the Court of Appeal defines corroborative evidence to mean “evidence that differs from but strengthens or confirms other evidence. The court amplified thus:
“Corroborative evidence must be independent and capable of implicating the accused in relation to the offence charged, and it must also be credible and must go to confirm and support that evidence which is sufficient, satisfactory and credible.”
From the above definitions which throw up a number of legal issues which shall be examined shortly, it is clear that corroboration is a piece of evidence which confirms, reinforces or supports another piece of evidence of the same fact.
corroborative audit evidence
Firstly, it must be noted that in all cases where corroboration is required whether as a matter of law or practice, in the absence of such corroboration, any verdict arrived at will be quashed on Appeal; See the case of Iko V. The State (supra)at 1178.
Also, if evidence which does not provide corroboration is treated as such, any verdict reached in the circumstance will be quashed on appeal unless to substantial miscarriage of justice is occasioned thereby.
Secondly, where corroboration is required, the corroborative evidence should consist of any independent testimony or evidence extraneous to the evidence sought to be corroborated. This is because corroboration is not a repetition or verbatim reproduction of the earlier statement or evidence sought to be corroborated.
This is because corroboration is not a repetition or verbatim reproduction of the earlier statement or evidence sought to be corroborated. Rather, it must confirm, support or fortify in some material particular, the evidence in need of corroboration. The rule that a witness cannot corroborate himself is statutorily provided for in section 34(2) of the Act which provides that:
“For the purpose of any rule of law or practice requiring evidence to be corroborated or regulating the manner in which uncorroborated evidence is to be treated, a statement rendered admissible as evidence by this Act shall not be treated as corroboration of evidence given by the maker of the statement”. The implication of the provision of the foregoing section is simply that a witness cannot corroborate his own testimony.
In criminal cases as noted in the case of Nwambe V. The State, the corroborative evidence must show or tend to show two ingredients namely: not merely that a crime has been committed, but also that the crime was committed by the accused person. The Supreme Court in the case of Iko V. The State clearly restated the position of the law and for its aptness, we take the liberty to echo the court as follows:
“Corroborative evidence is an independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting him with the crime, or implicating the accused in relation to the offence charged.
It must be credible evidence which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed but also that the accused committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rules of practice at common law or required by statute.
Finally, in concluding these preliminary remarks, the utilitarian value of corroboration must be noted, though inferable from the above discussion. The Court of Appeal stated the essence of corroborated evidence very clearly in the case of Omoteloye V. The State (1989)1 CLRN 142 as follows:
“The essence of corroborative evidence is that one credit-worthy witness confirms that another credit-worthy witness has said, as the risk of conviction of an innocent person is lessened if the conviction is based on the testimony of more than one acceptable witness and the corroborative evidence furnishes a safe ground which makes a conviction more sure than it would be without such evidence.
Cases in Which Corroboration is Required
As noted in our preamble, there are exceptional cases in which corroboration is required either as a matter of law or as a matter of practice and to these exceptional cases we now turn.
Cases Where Corroboration is Required as a Matter of Law
The Evidence Act provides a number of instances where corroboration is required as a matter of law. These instances are specifically provided for in sections, 197, 201 to 204. Although evidence of an accomplice and co-accused is not required to be corroborated, from judicial pronouncements, their evidence can only ground conviction, if corroborated.
- Evidence of an Accomplice:
By section 198(1) of the Act, a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but where the only proof against an accused is the uncorroborated evidence of the accomplice, then the judge must warn himself that it is unsafe to convict on such evidence.
By this provision, therefore, a judge is entitled to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice subject only to the requirement of warning since it is generally unsafe to convict on such uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See the case of Sokoto V. The State (1968)1 All NWLR 117.
- Evidence of Co-accused:
Section 199 provides in clear term that a co-accused is not an accomplice whose evidence requires extra-cautious treatment. For purpose of completeness, we take the liberty to reproduce the provision as follows.
“Where defendants are tried jointly and any of them gives evidence on his own behalf which incriminates a co-defendant the defendant who gives such evidence shall not be considered to be an accomplice. In Younge V. C.O.P. (1992)9 SCNJ 115, the Supreme Court on this point held that,
“Although a co-accused is not to be treated as an accomplice, the practice is always to treat such evidence with caution”. This point has been re-iterated in a number of cases. In Enewoh v. The State, the supreme Court held that the evidence of a co-accused should always be treated with caution.
- Treason and Treasonable Offences:
Where a person is charged with treason, concealment of treason, treasonable felonies and promoting native war, he cannot be convicted without corroborative evidence except on his own plea of guilt or on the evidence in open court of two witnesses testifying at the least to one overt act of the kind of treason or felony alleged, or the evidence of one witness to one overt act and one other witness to another overt act of the same kind of treason or felony – Section 201(1).
In other words, if a person is standing trial for any of the offences mentioned above, corroboration is required unless he pleads guilty to the offence alleged.
- Charge of Perjury:
By Section 202 of the Act
“A person cannot be convicted of committing perjury or of counseling or procuring the commission of perjury, upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, contradicting the oath on which perjury is assigned, unless circumstances are proved which corroborate such witness.
- Charge of Exceeding Speed Limit:
Where a person is charged with trhe offence of exceeding the statutory maximum speed limit, such a person cannot be convicted solely on the evidence of one witness that, in his opinion, the accused was driving at such speed – Section 203 (1).
Cases Where Corroboration is required As A Matter Of Practice
Quite apart from the case demonstrated above where corroboration is statutorily required, there are a number of well established situations, evolved by practice, where the courts will insist on corroboration. To these situations, we now turn.
- Sexual Offences
It would be recalled that section 179(5) of the repealed Act required corroboration in certain sexual offences. The current Act did not re-enact this provision. The implication is that in all cases involving sexual offences, corroboration is only required as a matter of practice.
Thus, an accused will not be readily convicted for rape upon the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecution. To convict, the judge will normally warn himself of the danger of convicting on such uncorroborated testimony. The law on this point was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in the case of Iko v. The State, where, in a charge of rape, the court held, inter alia, as follows:
“Though corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case is not essential in law, it is in practice always looked for and the judge must warn himself or the jury against the danger of acting upon her uncorroborated testimony.
Amplifying, the court concluded that:
It is not the rule of law that a person charged with rape cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. Even though it is not safe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix, the court may, after paying due attention to the warning, nevertheless convict the accused if it is satisfied with the truth of her evidence.
- Sworn Evidence of a Child
As previously noted, a child who understands the question put to him or her and can furnish rational answer thereto is a competent witness. If such a child has attained the age of 14 years, his evidence will be received on oath.
However, as a matter of practice, a court will not readily convict on such evidence without corroboration. The law in this regard was well articulated by the Supreme Court in the case of Onyegbu v. The State as follows:
“The sworn evidence of a child need not as matter of law be corroborated but it is desirable that the judge should warn himself of the risk of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of a young boy or girl though he may do do if convinced that the witness is telling the truth.
However, a conviction is not bad purely and exclusively because it was predicated on the unsworn evidence of a child as the sworn evidence of a child occupies the same legal platform as that of an adult as long as it is credible and not discredited through the instrumentality of cross-examination.
- Matrimonial Causes
In matrimonial causes, the court will be very wary in granting a decree on the uncorroborated evidence of the petitioner although the court is entitled to do so.
Corroborative evidence may be provided by the conduct of either of the parties or the circumstances of the case. In Ademola v. Ademola & Anor (1957)WRNLR 208, Corroboration was found in the conduct of the respondent, who in a divorce petition based on adultery, failed to file an answer.
- Confessional Statement by Accused
As already stated, although a conviction can be predicated solely on the confessional statement of the accused, the court will not readily convict on such uncorroborated evidence. In Kasa v. The State, the Supreme Court stated the law as follows:
“Where the only evidence available is the confessional statement of the accused person, it becomes desirable for the court to be very cautious in convicting the accused of the offence charged merely on his confession. Hence the desirability to have outside the confession. Hence the desirability to have outside the confession, some material evidence, be it slight, of the circumstance which makes it probable that the confession is true.
In Haruna Isah v. The State, the Supreme Court emphasized the imperative need for corroboration of confessional statement as follows: “To convict on a confessional statement of an accused person, there must be corroboration, however, scant, minute or slight”.
The above is not to be interpreted to mean that a confessional statement without more cannot be the sole basis of a conviction for, as the court stated in Idowu v. The State
“A free and voluntary confession of guilt made by an accused person, if it is direct and positive is sufficient to warrant his conviction without any corroborative evidence as long as the court is satisfied of the truth of the confession.
Therefore, the law is that while a court may rightly convict on the confessional statement of an accused, in practice, it will not readily convict without seeking some corroborative evidence especially in cases where such confessional statements are subsequently retracted.
In other words, while it is desirable not to convict on uncorroborated confessional statement, a conviction will not be illegal merely because it was predicated on uncorroborated confessional statement.
Effect Of Absence Of Corroboration
From what has been said so far the effect of absence of corroboration where required is undoubtedly obvious.
However, for purposes of clarity and completeness, it is considered important to emphasize here the legal effect of absence of corroboration where required either by law or in practice. In Iko v. The State, the Supreme Court stated the position of the law as follows:
“In all cases where the law provides that corroboration is necessary, a conviction of an accused can only be valid when there is such corroborative evidence.
The practical and legal implication of this is that a conviction will be illegal, and will, ipso facto, be quashed, if entered without the requisite corroborative evidence/ in other words, although it does not require a sea of heads to prove a case in court, where corroborative evidence is required and none is provided, the case is not established.
Where corroboration is required as a matter of practice, a conviction is not illegal and may not be liable to be set aside if it is predicated on uncorroborated evidence. The judge must, however warn himself that it is undesirable to convict on uncorroborated evidence.
If evidence which does not amount to corroborative evidence is treated as such, a conviction entered in the circumstance will be quashed on appeal if there is no other corroborative evidence.
Where other corroborative evidence exists, the conviction will not be disturbed on appeal. The case of John Ibeakanwa v. The Queen clearly illustrates this point. Furthermore, if a judge wrongly holds that evidence which requires corroboration does not require it, a conviction predicated on such finding will be set aside on appeal.
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